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Hagberg: Trusts--Constitutional Law--Retroactivity of Provision of 1931 Co
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
TRUSTS -

RETROACTIVITY OF PROCONSTITUTIONAL LAW In 1930 plaintiff
TRUSTS.
CODE AS TO PAROL

1931
by deed conveyed land to defendant on parol trust for plaintiff.
In 1933 plaintiff seeks a reconveyance. In the meantime 36-1-4
had been enacted, requiring a writing only in the case of a declaration of trust by settlor. Held: In the absence of fraud, grantor
cannot here set up a parol trust in his favor; and the statute of
1931 does not effect the rule, so far as it relates to deeds executed
prior thereto. Hall v. Burns.'
enacted their
When Virginia and in turn West Virginia
Statutes of Frauds, Sec. VII of the English Statute of Frauds'
making a writing necessary in order to create enforceable express
trusts, was omitted. As a consequence, it would seem that in
West Virginia all parol trusts were valid. But in the early case
of Troll v. Carter' the rule was laid down that a grantor could not
have an oral trust in his favor because it violated the parol
evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. It is argued that the
parol evidence rule has nothing to do with the case.' However,
the rule and its reasons were followed by a long line of decisions
until it became settled law in West Virginia.'
36-1-4' was enacted to "clarify the law upon the whole subject of trusts."' Can it operate retroactively so as to change the
result reached in the principal case?
Itis suggested that the answer may be derived from the
analogous instance in the field of retroactive laws, of reviving an
VISION OF

-169 S. E. 522 (W. Va. 1933).
2
HENING, STATS. AT LARGE, vol. 12, (1785) c. LXIV; CODE OF VIRGINIA
(1923) c. 232.
8
CODE (1868) c. 98; BARNES' W. VA. CODE (1923) c. 98; W. VA. REV. CODE
(1931) c. 31, art. 1, §§ 3 & 4.
'29 CHAs. II c. 3 (1676).
015 W. Va. 567 (1879).
'Madden, Trusta and the Statute of Frauds (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 166.
Of course, the parol evidence rule should not apply normally in equity; otherwise there never could be rescission for duress or fraud, or reformation for
mutual
mistake of fact, etc.
7
Zane v. Fink, 18 W. Va. 693 (1881);; Pusey v. Gardner, 21 W. Va. 469
(1883) ; Pain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 (1884) ; Handlan v. liandlan, 42 W. Va.
309, 26 S. E. 179 (1896); Richardson v. McConaughey, 55 W. Va. 546, 47
S. E. 287 (1904); Crawford v. Workman, 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322 (1908);
Hawkinberry v. Metz, 91 W. Va. 637, 640, 114 S. E. 240 (1922).
'"No declaration of trust of land shall be enforceable, unless it be made
in writing, signed by the person who declared such trust, or by his agent. If
a conveyance of land, not fraudulent, is made to one in trust, either for the
grantor or a third person, such trust may be enforced, though it be not disclosed on the face of the conveyance, nor evidenced by writing .....
' See Revisers' note to 36-1-4 supra n. R.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
action barred by the statute of limitations. There are three views
as to the validity of such laws ," 1. These are valid.' 2. These are
invalid.' 3. These are permissible where the circumstances appeal
with some strength to the prevailing views of justice.'
Yet all
cases under the first and third group agree that the scope of valid
retroactivity is limited, and does not extend to reviving actions
barred by the statute of limitations, involving title to specific
property."
The parol evidence rule is, in West Virginia, a rule of substantive law,' and fixed the status of the parties in the deed of
1930. Those "vested rights must not be disturbed".'
-R.

E.

HAGBERG.

Note (1924) 19 ILL. L. Rv.355.
uCampbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 29 L. Ed. 483 (Tex. 1885). (Removal
of the statute of limitations with regard to a debt); see also, 45 L. R.A. 609,
for a summary of cases.
"Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441 (1895); Eingartner v. lRnois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373 (1899); see also, 45 L. R. A. 609.
'Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472 (1901); Dunbar v. Boston
& P. R. Corp., 181 Mass. 383 (1902); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U. S.205 (N. Y. 1917).
1 Supra n. 11 and n. 13. (In Campbell v. Holt, p. 623, the court says, "It
may, therefore, very well be held that, in an action to recover real or personal
property, where the question is as to the removal of the bar of the statute of
limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar has become perfect, such
act deprives the party of his property without due process of law. The
reason is, tlat, by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property
had become the defendant's. Both the legal title and real ownership had
become vested in him, and to give the act the effect of transferring this title
to plaintiff, would be to deprive him of his property without due process of
law. "
10

"JONES, COMMEN
IES ON EVMENCE (2d ed.) § 1842; GnE
,EAF (16th
ed) § 305a; WinxoRE oN EVIDENCE (2d ed.) § 2400; 22 C. J. p. 1075, § 1380.

0Johnson v. Sanger, 49 W. Va. 405, 38 S. E. 645 (1901); 12 C. J. on
Constitutional Law, § 486; 6 R. C. L. on Constitutional Law, § 293. See
also, supra n. 14.
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